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Abstract This paper provides a brief description ofthe evolution and currenl
structure ofthe individual quota sy.stem (IQ) in the Icelandic fisheries. This
particular fisheries managetrienl system was introduced at different times in
different fisheries—in the herring fisheries in 1976, in the capelin fishery in 1980
and the demersal fisheries in 1984. Since 1990 all Icelandic fisheries have been
subject to a uniform sysfetn of individual transferable quotas (ITQs).
The paper discusses the social and economic impetus for the initial adop-
tion ofthe ITQ fisheries system in the various fisheries, sketches its subsequent
development and describes the key elements of the current system. Assess-
ments ofthe economic impact ofthe ITQ system are presented in the last part
of the paper. Although a definitive study of this impact is not available, the
various indicators presented generally indicate an improvement, sometimes
substantial one, in the economic efficiency of the fisheries in question.
Keywords Individual transferable quotas, fishery management, economic im-
pact and performance.
Introduction
One of the most interesting proposals for improved fisheries management gener-
ated by fisheries economics is the institution of individual transferable quotas
(ITQs). Within the framework of simplified analytical models it is possible to show
that an appropriately designed ITQ system is capable of producing full economic
rents from fisheries.' These analytical models, however, represent at best an
approximation to the economics of actual fisheries. In addition, they generally
ignore the social environment in which the fisheries operate. It is therefore of
great scientific as well as practical importance to study the socio-economic con-
ditions that allow the actual introduction of an ITQ system and to monitor the
subsequent course of fisheries.
This paper considers the ITQ system in the Icelandic fisheries. It describes the
origin, evolution and the current structure ofthe system and presents indicators
of its economic impact. The paper is organized roughly as follows: The first
section contains a background description of the Icelandic fisheries. The origin
and evolution of the ITQ fisheries management system is outlined in the second
section. The structure ofthe current ITQ system is described in the third section.
Finally, in the fourth section, the economic performance of the ITQ system to
date is assessed.
' See e.g. Amason 1990.
201202 Arnason
The Icelandic Fisheries: A Descriptive Background
The most important Icelandic fishery by far is the demersal or groundfish fishery.
In recent years this fishery has usually generated between 75% and 80% of the
total value ofthe catches. The most important demersal species are cod, haddock,
redfish and saithe. Pelagic fisheries based exclusively on capelin and herring are
also important, usually yielding 10-15% of the total catch value. In addition to
demersal and pelagic fisheries, there are significant shrimp, lobster and scallop
fisheries. A more detailed numerical description of these fisheries and their rela-
tive importance is provided in Table 1.
The fishing fleet consists of several vessel types. It is convenient, however, to
decompose the fleet into four main classes;
1. Deep-sea Trawlers:
These are relatively large fishing vessels usually between 200 and 1200 GRT (gross
registered tonnes) and 130 and 250 feet in length. They are engaged almost ex-
clusively in the demersal fisheries employing bottom and occasionally mid-water
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* At 1990 catch prices and USD values.
** Mainly Greenland halibut, catfish, plaice, tusk and ling.
*** MSY estimate represents the Icelandic share.Iceland's ITQ System 203
trawl. Due to their size, the deep sea trawlers have a wide operating range and are
able to exploit practically any fishing ground off Iceland. Each trip usually lasts
for about 5 to 15 days. A number of the deep-sea trawlers have recently been
turned into freezer trawlers.
2. Specialized Purse Seiners:
From 200 GRT and up, these vessels are primarily engaged in the capelin fishery.
Most also participate in other fisheries, particularly the deep sea shrimp fishery
and the herring fishery. The specialized purse seiners usually follow the capelin
schools over great distances and land their catches where it is most convenient.
3. Multipurpose Vessels:
The multipurpose vessels cover a wide size range. The typical multipurpose ves-
sel is smaller than those previously discussed. Some, however, are quite large,
i.e.. over 200 GRT. The multipurpose fleet is, for the most part, neither special-
ized with respect to fishing gear nor fishery. Most of the multipurpose fleet is
designed as gillnetters or longliners although they are technically capable of em-
ploying trawl and purse seine as well. The geographical range of the smaller
multipurpose vessels is limited and they are normally confined to one- to three-
day fishing trips exploiting fishing grounds relatively close to their home port.
4. The Part Time Fleet
This class of fishing vessels covers numerous vessels of sizes up to 20 GRT
although most are under 10 GRT. These vessels are typically owner operated and
employed on a seasonal basis. This fieet employs handline, gillnets and longline.
Depending on the fishery, the crew size is one to three persons. As the smaller of
the part time fieet, namely vessels under 12 GRT and subsequently 10 GRT, were
not subject to vessel quota restrictions until 1988, this component of the part time
fleet has mushroomed in recent years.
Further details about the Icelandic fishing fieet are set out in Table 2 below. As
shown in that table, the average age of the fishing fleet is rather high. This refiects
i.a. the effects of more restrictive fishery management measures and official ef-
forts in recent years to halt new investment in the fishing fleet.
The Origins and Evolution of the Fisheries Management System
Until the introduction of the vessel quota system in the demersal fisheries in 1984,
the Icelandic fisheries were for the most part common property ones.^ First, until
the extension of the fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles in 1976, the Icelandic fish-
eries were, for all intents and purposes, international fisheries. Large foreign
fishing fleets featured prominently on the fishing grounds, taking almost half of the
^ Due to the introduction of vessel quotas in the herring and capelin fisheries a few years
earlier, the common property nature of these fisheries had been eliminated. These fisher-
ies, however, only accounted for about '/la of the value of Icelandic fisheries.204 Arnason
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NA = Data not available.
demersal catch. The extension of the fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles all but
eliminated foreign participation in the Icelandic fisheries. However, the initial
management measures taken in the demersal fisheries following the extension of
the fisheries jurisdiction in 1976 were inadequate and therefore did not alter the
common property nature of these fisheries as far as domestic fishermen were
concerned. They were still forced to compete for shares in the catch. Therefore,
not surprisingly, the development of the Icelandic fisheries in the post-war era
closely followed the path predicted for common property fisheries (see e.g. Gor-
don, 1954) exhibiting increasingly excessive fishing capital and effort compared to
the reproductive capacity ofthe fish stocks. The post-war development of fishing
capital and catch values before the introduction of the demersal vessel quota
system in 1984 is illustrated in Figure 1.
As Figure 1 indicates, the value of fishing capital employed in the Icelandic
fisheries increased almost by well over 1200% from 1945-1983. Real catch values,
on the other hand, only increased by 300% during the same period. Thus the
growth in fishing capital exceeded the increase in catch values by a factor of more
than four. This means that in 1983 the output-capital ratio in the Icelandic fisheries
was less than Vi ofthe output-capital ratio in 1945.
This long-term decline in the economic performance ofthe Icelandic fisheries
did not go unnoticed by the fisheries authorities. In fact, over the years, various
measures were taken in an attempt to reverse this trend. However, before the
extension ofthe exclusive fishing zone to 200 miles in 1976, effective management
ofthe fisheries, especially the demersal ones, appeared impracticable due to the
presence of large foreign fleets on the fishing grounds. For this reason, fishery
management prior to the extension of the fishing limits to 200 miles was minimal.
With the de facto recognition ofthe exclusive 200 mile fishing zone in 1976, the
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Figure 1. Fishing Capital and Catch Values 1945-1983: Constant prices. Indices (100 in
1945).
come under gradually increasing management, culminating in a uniform ITQ sys-
tem in practically all fisheries since 1990. The chronology of this development is
summarized in Table 3.
A more detailed review of the evolution of the ITQ fisheries management
system in individual Icelandic fisheries is as follows:
The Herring Fishery
In 1966, due to an alarming decline in the herring stocks, an overall quota was
imposed on this fishery. Since this did not halt the decline in the stocks, a com-
plete herring moratorium was introduced in 1972. In 1976, when fishing from the
Icelandic herring stocks was partly resumed, it was obvious that the whole fleet
could not participate. Hence, an individual vessel quota system with limited eli-
Table 3
Key Steps in the Evolution of the ITQ Management System:
A Chronological Overview
1976 The herring fishery: Individual vessel quotas.
1979 The herring fishery: Vessel quotas made transferable.
1980 The capelin fishery: Individual vessel quotas.
1984 The demersal fisheries: Individual transferable vessel quotas.
1985 The demersal fisheries: Effort quotas option introduced.
1986 The capelin fishery: Vessel quotas made transferable.
1988 Transferable vessel quotas in all fisheries. Effort quota option retained.
1990 A complete uniform system of transferable vessel quotas in all fisheries.206 Arnason
gibility was introduced. Vessel quotas, however, were small and in 1979, by a
Ministerial decree and industry support, fairly unrestricted transfers of quotas
between vessels were permitted. In 1988, the vessel quota system in the herring
fishery became part of the genera! fisheries vessel quota system.
The Capelin Fishery
The capelin fishery, which became very big in the seventies, was subjected to
limited entry and individual vessel quotas for licence holders in 1980 at a time
when the stock was seriously threatened with exhaustion. Again the arguments
were the same as in the herring fishery previously. The positive experience with
the vessel quota system in the herring fishery also proved a convincing argument
for adopting a similar system in the much more important capelin fishery. In 1986,
in conjunction with an increasing transferability of demersal vessel quotas, cape-
lin vessel quotas became partly transferable. In 1988, the capelin vessel quota
system became a part of the general fisheries vessel quota system with fairly
unrestricted transfers of quotas.
The Demersal Fisheries
In connection with the extension ofthe exclusive fishing zone to 2(X) miles in 1976,
the major demersal fisheries were subjected to overall catch quotas. The quotas
recommended by the marine biologists soon proved quite restrictive and thus
difficult to uphold. Therefore, individual effort restrictions, taking the form of
limited allowed fishing days for each vessel, were introduced in 1978. However,
as new entry remained possible and the demersal fleet continued to grow, the
allowable fishing days had to be reduced from year to year. Thus, it became
gradually obvious to everyone concerned that this system was economically
wasteful. Consequently, in 1984, following a sharp drop in the demersal stock and
catch levels, a system of individual vessel quotas was introduced. Initially regu-
lations to this effect were issued for one year only. Due to generally favourable
results ofthe system, it was extended. However, to ensure sufficient support for
the system, a very important provision was added. Vessels were allowed to opt
for effort restrictions instead of catch quotas. In 1988, the Icelandic Legislature,
the Althing, enacted a general vessel quota legislation applying to all Icelandic
fisheries effective for 1988-1990. This legislation retained the effort quota option
but made it somewhat less attractive. In 1990 a complete, comprehensive ITQ
legislation was passed by the Althing. This legislation abolished the effort quota
option and closed certain other loopholes in the previous legislation, especially as
regards the operation of vessels under 10 GRT. It, moreover, extended the ITQ
system indefinitely albeit with a stipulation for a revision in 1993.
As may be inferred from this description, the course towards a complete ITQ
fisheries management system in Iceland has evolved more by trial and error than
by design. In most countries, and Iceland is no exception, there is strong social
opposition to radical changes in the institutional framework of production and
employment. A great deal of this opposition seems to derive from traditional
values and vested interests rather than rational arguments. Therefore, in Iceland,
it was probably unavoidable from a socio-political point of view to pass through
an evolutionary process during which various management methods were tried inIceland's ITQ System 207
different fisheries. The knowledge and understanding gained from these experi-
ments were probably crucial for the eventual acceptance of the much more effi-
cient ITQ system.
At the same time, it should be noted, that the key steps in the evolution of the
ITQ system have usually only been taken in response to crises in the respective
fisheries due to a sudden reduction in stock levels. Thus, individual vessel quotas
were introduced in the herring fishery in 1976 following a collapse in the herring
stocks and a prolonged moratorium on herring catches. Similarly, vessel quotas in
the capelin fishery and the ITQ system in the demersal fisheries were introduced
in the early 1980s in response to a perceived danger of a corresponding collapse
in these fisheries.
This pattern refiects, above anything else, the reluctance of members of the
fishing industry to accept changes in the traditional organization of the fisheries.
Only when faced with a disaster in the form of a significant fall in income due to
fish stock reductions or a drop in the worid market price for fish products, have
the interest groups been willing to consider changes in the institutional framework
of the fisheries.
The passing of the comprehensive ITQ fisheries management legislations in
1988 and even more so in 1990 constitutes a break with this pattern. For the first
time, the fishing industry has agreed to a significant improvement in the fisheries
management system without being threatened with the alternative of a financial
disaster. This, I think, must be attributed to the potentially immense economic
benefits of the vessel quota system that have now become apparent to most of the
participants in the fisheries.
The Current ITQ Fisheries Management System
Let us now turn to the description of the current ITQ fisheries management
system in Iceland. Although this system was instituted at different times and in
somewhat different form in the various fisheries, it was, as mentioned above,
made uniform by the Fisheries Management Legislation passed in 1990.
The essential features of the current ITQ system are as follows: All fisheries
are subject to vessel catch quotas. The quotas represent shares in the Total
Allowable Catch (TAC). They are permanent, perfectly divisible and fairly freely
transferable. They are issued subject to a small annual charge to cover enforce-
ment costs.
It should be noted that the ITQ system was superimposed on an earlier man-
agement system designed mainly for the protection of juvenile fish. This system
involving certain gear, area and fish size restrictions is still largely in place. The
ITQ system has not, in other words, replaced these components of the earlier
fisheries management system.
Further details of the ITQ-system in the Icelandic fisheries are given below:
(1) Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
The Ministry of Fisheries determines the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for each of
the most important species in the fisheries. This decision is made on the basis of
recommendations from the Marine Research Institute, ln the past the Ministry of208 Arnason
Fisheries has followed the recommendations of the Marine Research Institute
quite closely.
Several species, i.e., those on which fishing pressure is regarded as slight, are
not currently subject to TAC. This means that the corresponding fisheries can be
pursued freely. These fisheries are, in most cases, commercially negligible.
(2) Permanent Quota Shares
Each eligible vessei is issued a permanent share in the TAC for every species for
which there is a TAC. These permanent quota shares may be referred to as
TAC-shares.
(3) Initial Allocation of Permanent Quota Shares
The initial allocation of TAC-shares to individual vessels varies somewhat over
fisheries. In the demersal, lobster and deep-sea shrimp fisheries the TAC-shares
are normally based on the vessel's historical catch record during certain base
years. In the demersal fisheries this usually equals the vessel's average share in
the total catch during the 3 years prior to the introduction of the vessel quota
system in 1984. There are noteworthy exceptions to this rule, however. If, for
instance, the vessel in question was not operating normally during 1981-3 due e.g.
to major repairs or having entered the fleet after 1981, the calculated share is
adjusted upwards. Also, during the years 1985-1987, it was possible to modify the
TAC-shares by temporarily opting for effort restrictions instead of vessel quotas
and demonstrating high catches during this period. In the herring and inshore
shrimp fisheries the initial TAC-shares were equal. The same holds for the capelin
fishery except that Vi of the TAC-shares were initially allocated on the basis of
vessel hold capacity.
(4) Annual Vessel Quotas
The size of each vessel's annual quota in a specific fishery is a simple multiple of
the TAC for that fishery and the vessel's TAC-share.
(5) Divisibility and Transferability
Both the TAC-shares and the annual quotas are transferable and perfectly divis-
ible. This means that any fraction of a given quota may be transferred to another
vessel.
TAC-shares are transferable without any restrictions whatsoever. Transfers of
annual vessels quotas, on the other hand, is subject to some restrictions. Annual
vessel quotas are freely transferable between vessels within the same geograph-
ical region. Transfers of annual quotas between geographical regions are, on the
other hand, subject to revision by the respective fishermen's unions and the local
authorities. The rationale for this stipulation is to stabilize local employment in the
short run. In practice, however, it appears that few inter-regional transfers are
actually blocked.
Apart from this, transfers of quotas are only subject to registration with theIceland's ITQ System 209
Ministry of Fisheries. The particulars of the exchange, including price, are not
registered.
(6) Restricted Access
All commercial fishing vessels must hold valid fishing licences.' Fishing licences,
moreover, are issued only to vessels already in the fishery in 1990 and their
replacements provided they are deemed comparable in terms of fishing power.
The fishing licences are not transferable.
Thus, in addition to the ITQ-system, the Icelandic fisheries are subject to
restricted access. One ofthe impacts of a well designed ITQ system is to provide
the socially appropriate incentive for disinvestment (investment) in the fishing
fleet. The fishing licence stipulation clearly adds a deterrent to investment in
fishing vessels.
(7) Exemptions from the ITQ System
There are two minor exemptions from the current ITQ system—both in the de-
mersal fisheries. The first concerns longline demersal fisheries in mid-winter.
More precisely, 50% of the demersal catch of vessels employing longline during
the months of November through February each winter is exempt from quota
restrictions. The reason for this exception is primarily to support regional em-
ployment during this period.
Second, handline fisheries by vessels under 6 GRT are exempted from quota
restrictions and subject to limited fishing days. This arrangement, however, is
only temporary and is due to end in 1994, when according to the current legisla-
tion, this class of vessels is also supposed to become subject to the ITQ system.
(8) Quota Fees
The annual vessel quotas calculated in the above-described manner were initially
issued by the Ministry of Fisheries free of charge. However, according to the
Fisheries Management Legislation of 1990, the Ministry of Fisheries is to collect
fees for catch quotas to cover the cost of monitoring and enforcing the ITQ
regulations. The law imposes an upper bound on this fee amounting to 0.2% ofthe
estimated catch value.
The Performance of the ITQ System
The main purpose of the vessel quota system is to improve the economic effi-
ciency of the fisheries. The Icelandic fisheries are biologically very productive
and should be able to generate high economic rents. Until the adoption of the
vessel quota system, however, comparatively low rents were generated in the
industry. In fact, during the years preceding the introduction of the vessel quota
system in the various fisheries industry profits were often highly negative.
^ This is in addition to catch quotas.210 Arnason
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Figure 2. The Herring Fishery: Development of Catches and Fishing Effort.
The Herring Fishery
When the herring fishery was resumed in 1976, at the end of a three year fishing
moratorium, a system of individual catch quotas was imposed. Due to the gener-
ally favourable experience with this system, the quotas were made perfectly di-
visible and transferable in 1979. In 1990, the herring fisheries management system
was incorporated—largely unchanged—in the comprehensive fisheries manage-
ment system for the Icelandic fisheries.
The individual transferable quota system in the herring fishery has been very
successful. Since 1977 herring catches have tripled. Fishing effort,'* on the other
hand has not increased. In fact it has declined by some 20%. This means that the
technical efficiency in the herring fishery is now roughly 5 times higher than it was
at the outset ofthe vessel quota system in the fishery 16 years ago.
The development of fishing effort and catches in the herring fishery is further
described in Figure 2.
The Capelin Fishery
An individual vessel quota system was introduced in the capelin fishery in 1980.
In 1986 the quotas were made transferable. In 1990 the capelin management
system was incorporated in the overall Icelandic fisheries management system.
The capelin is a short lived species and the fishery, which depends on a single
cohort each year, is very volatile. Since the introduction of the vessel quota
system in 1980 there has been no trend in catch levels. Mean catches have re-
•* Fishing effort is here defined as the application of fishing capital to the fishery and is
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Figure 3. The Capelin Fishery: Development of Catches and Fishing Fleet.
mained roughly unchanged. The capelin fleet, on the other hand, has been sub-
stantially reduced. The number of vessels has declined by 40% and the total
tonnage of the fleet has been reduced by about 20%. Thus, there are strong
indications that the efficiency of the capelin fishery has been substantially in-
creased since the introduction ofthe vessel quota system. The development ofthe
catch and the fleet size in terms of tonnage is illustrated in Figure 3.
The Demersal Fisheries
The demersal fisheries are by far the most important Icelandic fisheries, account-
ing for over 75% of the total value of the catch. These fisheries were subjected to
an individual transferable quota system in 1984. This system was subsequently
under almost continuous revision until the adoption ofthe uniform fisheries man-
agement system in 1990.
The Trend in Fishing Capital and Fishing Effort
We have seen that one of the reasons for the dissipation of economic rents in the
Icelandic fisheries has been overinvestment in fishing capital and excessive fish-
ing effort. Therefore one of the tests of the efficacy of the vessel quota system is
the development of fishing capital and aggregate fishing effort since the introduc-
tion ofthe system.
The trend in fishing capital and fishing effort^ in the demersal fisheries in
recent years is illustrated in Figure 4.
As shown in Figure 4, the previous growth in the value of aggregate harvesting




78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 67 88 89 90 91 92
•^—Effort —t— Capital
Figure 4. The Demersal Fisheries: Development of Fishing Capital and Effort.
capital halted abruptly in 1984 when the vessel quota system was introduced. In
fact, fishing capital contracted 1984-85. This was the first time since 1969 that the
value ofthe fishing fleet actually decreased. In the preceding 15 years this capital
value had grown at an annual rate of over 6%. Thus, at this point, the vessel quota
system seems to have generated beneficial results.* In 1986, on the other hand,
investment in fishing capital resumed at a high rate. This resumption of invest-
ment, should not, however, be interpreted as a failure ofthe vessel quota system
as such. After all, the increase in the value of fishing capital since the inception of
the ITQ system has amounted to just over 3% annually while during the preceding
15 years this annual increase was over 6%. Moreover, most of the investment
since 1986 can be explained by factors extraneous to the ITQ system.
First, a good deal of the investment in fishing capital from 1986 onwards has
consisted ofthe installation of freezing equipment and the corresponding modifi-
cations of several deep-sea trawlers.^ This part of the investment is, in other
words, in fish processing capital employing new and profitable techniques. Sec-
ond , a part of the investment was in specialized trawlers for the emerging and very
valuable deep-sea prawn fishery which was not subject to vessel quotas until 1988.
Third, by the mid 1980s a significant fraction ofthe deep-sea trawler fleet was due
for replacement. As the years 1986 and 87 were unusually profitable for the
harvesting sector, many firms took the opportunity to replace their aging vessels.
Fourth, during this period there was a very significant investment in small vessels
(under 12 and subsequently 10 GRT) that were not subject to the vessel quota
*• Note, however, that the years 1982-84 were periods of heavy losses for the fishing
industry. Therefore the halt in investment in 1984-5 can hardly be attributed exclusively to
the vessel quota system.
' In 1983 there were 3 freezer trawlers. In 1990 they were 28.Iceland's ITQ System 213
system. Last but not least, the effort quota option in the demersal fisheries,
introduced in 1985, undermined the efficiency incentives ofthe ITQ system in-
ducing many vessel owners to upgrade or replace their vessels. The effort quota
option was abolished in 1990 and, in fact, we see a significant reduction in fishing
capital in that year. More importantly, this reduction continues in 1991 and 1992.
In fact, during the three years, from 1990 to 1992, the value of fishing capital was
reduced by almost 15%.
The course of demersal fishing effort tells a similar story. As indicated in
Figure 4, fishing effort in the demersal fisheries dropped by some 15% in 1984, the
first year of the vessel quota system, and by an additional 6% in 1985. Since 1986,
on the other hand, fishing effort has increased considerably. This is no doubt
primarily due to the widespread selection of the iil-advised effort quota option
within the ITQ system during 1986-1990. Another important explanation for the
increase in fishing effort in 1989 and 1990 is the decline in the demersal fish stocks
without a commensurate reduction in the TACs thus requiring more fishing effort
to fill the catch quotas. In 1991, demersal fishing effort appears to have declined
somewhat again.
The main question, however, is not whether fishing effort has been reduced
from its 1983 level. The crucial measure ofthe impact ofthe vessel quota system
is the difference, if any, between the actual fishing effort 1984-1990 compared to
the fishing effort level that would have prevailed during the period had the vessel
quota system not been introduced.
Clearly, it is not at all straightforward to predict the course of fishing effort
under the earlier management regime. However, in an attempt to provide a partial
answer to this question, a simplistic model has been used to explain the path of
fishing effort under the two different management regimes. Essentially, a simple
trend model describing the path of fishing effort under the two management re-
gimes was specified. Somewhat more precisely, it was hypothesized that during
the 13 year period 1978-1990 fishing effort evolved over time according the rela-
tionship:
eit) = (a • D, + fc • £>2) - exp[{c • Di + c • D^) • I], t = 0, \, 2, . . . 12,
where eit) represents fishing effort in year / and t represents the years measured
from 0 to 12. O, and />2 are dummy variables for the two management regimes.
Thus D| = 1 during the years of restricted effort (e.g. 1978-1983) and 0 thereafter.
D2 = 0 in the years preceding 1984 and 1 thereafter. The coefficients a and b
represent the interceps and the coefficients c and d the growth rates of effort
under the two management regimes.
The hypothesis that there is no structural break in the evolution of fishing
effort between the two management regimes is resoundingly rejected. The rele-
vant test statistic is x"(2) = 58.9. Similarly the growth of fishing effort under the
ITQ regime is significantly lower than under the previous fisheries management
regime. The relevant test statistic is x^(l) = 6.9.
Employing this estimated relationship we may predict the fishing effort as-
suming that the vessel quota system had not been introduced in 1984 and compare
this to the actual fishing effort observed. The results of this exercise are illustrated
in Figure 5.
According to the estimation results illustrated in Figure 5, fishing effort under214 Arnason
Actual Predicted
Figure 5. Actual vs. Predicted Fishing Effort Assuming no ITQ System.
the earlier fisheries management system would, in all likelihood, have continued
to increase at a high rate after 1983. Judging from these estimates the vessel quota
system appears to have reduced total demersal fishing effort by some 34% com-
pared to the expected fishing effort under the previous management system. The
financial benefits of this kind of an effort reduction are very substantial. In inter-
preting these results, however, the reader should be mindful ofthe extreme sim-
plicity and mechanistic nature ofthe underlying model. In fact, the above results
should be regarded as indicative only.
More Direct Estimates of Economic Benefits
Let us now turn to more direct estimates ofthe economic benefits generated under
the vessel quota system. Unfortunately, little research has been done in this area
and the available information is consequently rather scant.
From a theoretical point of view, the economic benefits of a vessel quota
system should include the following items:
(1) A Reduction in Fishing Effort
Under the vessel quota system competition between vessels for a limited stock of
fish is eliminated. Consequently, the fishing firms will attempt to catch their
vessel quota with minimum fishing effort. It is important to realize, however, that
aggregate fishing effort will not necessarily be reduced if the TAC is excessive.^
* Given the size of the fish stocks, each TAC requires a certain minimunfi fishing effort. If
the TAC is set high relative to the size of the fish stocks aggregate effort may actually
increase under an ITQ system.Iceland's ITQ System 215
(2) Reduced Cost of Fishing Effort
Having secured private ownership of a certain volume of catch under the vessel
quota system, the fishing firm can concentrate on taking that catch with minimal
costs.
(3) Improved Quality of the Catch
Being bound by its vessel catch quotas, the fishing firms can only increase rev-
enues by improving the quality of this catch.
In a study carried out in 1985, the National Economic Institute attempted to
estimate the benefits of reduced fishing effort and improved quality ofthe catch in
the demersal fisheries for the year 1984. The conclusion was that the benefits of
reduced fishing effort amounted to some 14 M.USD and improved quality ofthe
catch to some 6 M.USD. The total number, 20 M.USD, is about 8.5% ofthe value
of the demersal fisheries in that year. These results were confirmed in a less
comprehensive study done in 1987.
Another way to approach the problem of estimating the rents generated in the
demersal fisheries as a result ofthe vessel quota system is to look at quota values.
As the catch quotas are transferable, a market for quotas has developed. In this
market, quotas are exchanged for other valuables such as money. Hence, apply-
ing standard economic theory and assuming that the market for quotas is reason-
ably effective, the value ofthe fishery should equal the total value of outstanding
quotas.^
The extent of the quota market in the demersal fisheries is described in Ta-
ble 4.
Table 4 shows that the extent of the demersal quota market is considerable. In
1984, the first year ofthe vessel quota system, about 11% of outstanding quotas
were exchanged. Since 1986 this percentage has fiuctuated between 20 and 30%.
However, due to a contraction in the volume of outstanding quotas resulting from
the widespread use ofthe effort quota option, the actual quantities exchanged in
1986-90 were not any greater than in 1984-85.
The economic rents generated in the demersal fisheries according to the quota
evaluation are given in Table 5.
Judging from the fourth column of Table 5. it appears that the total value of
outstanding quotas evaluated at the mid-point of the price range given, was some
46 M.USD in 1984 and 166 M.USD in 1990. However, these numbers almost
certainly underestimate the true value of demersal catch rights. The reason is that
they ignore the value of the nontradable catches which are mostly taken under
effort quotas. If all the demersal catch is evaluated at the vessel quota prices, we
obtain the valuation in the last column of Table 5. According to this column, the
economic rents generated in the demersal fisheries are very considerable and
constitute a significant fraction ofthe gross earnings ofthe fisheries.'"
^ Notice, however, that this value will not necessarily equal bookkeeping results. Quotas
will be bought on the market at a price up to their marginal variable profits. Fixed costs,
e.g. those associated with harvesting capital, are irrelevant for these transactions. There-
fore, a firm may buy quotas at a high price without being able to cover fixed costs.
'" Thus in 1989 the demersal quota values exceeded V* of total earnings in the demersal
fisheries.226 Arnason
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(1) Quotas exchanged in 1000 MT.
(2) Quotas exchanged as a percentage of total outstanding ves-
sel quotas.
NA Information not available.
* The new complete ITQ system took effect on Sept. 1 this year.
These estimates, however, must be interpreted with great care especially dur-
ing the latter part of the period. During these years, demersal catches were good
and fish prices extremely good. For this reason the quota prices for 1986-90 were
probably higher than would otherwise have been the case, although considerably
lower than in fully efficient equilibrium. More importantly, it must be realized that
one of the first effects of a reasonably complete ITQ system is to make excessive
fishing capital commercially redundant. This means that its market price falls
drastically, the opportunity cost of its use is reduced and the market value of catch
quotas is correspondingly increased. This, however, is a short term effect, that
will be reversed in the long run when the level of fishing capital reaches a new
equilibrium.
How does the economic performance of the demersal vessel quota system
compare with optimal economic utilization? Comparing the above quota price
valuation of fisheries rents with the maximum attainable rents according to an
empirical study ofthe Icelandic demersal fisheries (see Arnason, 1984), it appears
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that the realized economic rents in 1990 were well over 50% of the maximum
attainable ones. Previous reservations concerning the probable upward bias ofthe
quota values as estimators of sustainable rents in 1990 must, however, be
stressed. Nevertheless, it is clear that significant benefits have been generated by
the demersal vessel quota system. As fishing effort has been reduced only slightly,
this must primarily be attributed to reduced harvesting costs per unit of catch and
higher quality ofthe catch. In fact there is ample evidence that this has occurred.
The Problem of Discards
Discarding of catch or highgrading is an often cited problem with ITQ systems
especially in mixed fisheries. (See e.g. Rettig, 1986 and Squires and Kirkley,
1991). The Icelandic demersal fisheries are certainly mixed fisheries. Neverthe-
less, there is little evidence of increased discarding under the ITQ system. Ac-
cording to measurements published in a recent report by a government commis-
sion (Nefnd um Motun Sjavarutvegsstefnu, 1993), demersal discards range from
1-6% of total catch volume depending on gear and vessel type. Moreover, ac-
cording to this report there has been no detectable increase in discards since the
introduction ofthe vessel quota system in 1984.
Regional Impacts
The Icelandic ITQ system does not appear to have had an adverse regional impact
so far. In spite of a very substantial transfers of temporary and permanent quotas,
their regional allocation has remained remarkably invariant as indicated in Table
6. In fact, the regional pattern of demersal landings show a much greater volatility
than quota holdings both before and after the introduction ofthe ITQ system. The
main discernible trend in Table 6 is some movement of quotas from the metro-
politan and South-West regions to the Northern part ofthe country. This move-
ment, incidentally, conforms nicely with the objectives of regional policy in Ice-
land.
Conclusion
Versions of the ITQ fisheries management system have been in operation in
Icelandic fisheries since 1979. The evidence on the performance of this system is
generally favourable although somewhat mixed.
Table 6



























































































Source: Nefnd um M(5tun Sjavarutvegsstefnu218 Arnason
The introduction of the ITQ system in the herring fishery appears to have
produced a dramatic increase in efficiency. In the capelin fishery, the ITQ system
also appears to produced economic benefits although less dramatic than in the
herring fishery. In the demersal fisheries, the evidence is less conclusive. On the
one hand, the fishing fleet has increased and aggregate fishing effort has con-
tracted only slightly. On the other hand, various indicators including quota values
in the demersal fisheries strongly suggest that significant rents are being generated
by the system.
However, when interpreting the development of the demersal fisheries since
1984, the imperfectness of the ITQ system employed during the early part of the
period should be kept in mind. This applies especially to the wide-spread use of
the effort quota option during 1985-90. In fact, as shown in Table 4, the fisheries
management system was only partially an individual quota system in these years.
For this reason, the upward trend in harvesting capital and demersal fishing effort
during this period is hardly evidence of the failure of the ITQ system. In fact, as
previously explained, since the abolition of the effort quota option and the con-
solidation of the ITQ system in 1990, demersal fishing capital has declined sub-
stantially.
In addition, there is no evidence that the vessel quota system has increased
discarding of catch. Neither does it appear to have had an adverse impact on
regional habitation. In fact, the opposite is probably closer to the truth.
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